When working with micro data on consumer demand, there are many different situations where decisions involve only discrete choices. In this context, conditions under which an underlying rational preference structure exists are derived. Moreover, by introducing flexibility into the model, it is possible to identify nonrational behavior in the sample.
It is well established that a utility theoretic framework can be used to develop statistical models suitable for the analysis of discrete choices. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, testable conditions for the existence of an underlying rational preference structure are derived, in this particular context. Second, it is shown how a flexible enough specification allows the researcher to identify nonrational individual behavior in the sample.
It is shown in Proposition 1 that if each of the conditional indirect utility functions is well behaved, given the maximizing behavior of the consumers, the unconditional function is well behaved too.
Therefore, in order to test for the existence of an underlying rational preference structure, one only needs to focus on each conditional indirect utility function. It also shown in Proposition 2 that the conditions to be tested are greatly simplified in this context, since the conditional indirect utility functions are defined in the real line. In particular, monotonicity with respect to prices is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a well-behaved unconditional indirect utility function.
When the error terms enter additively, the existence of a well-behaved indirect utility function is either globally rejected or not rejected. In contrast to the additive error specification's results, 1 by allowing flexibility, in particular, considering the Random Coefficients Model, it is shown that it can be the case that for some observations, that is, for some individuals, a well-behaved indirect utility function exists, while for others it does not. Instead of assuming a priori rational individual choice behavior, a way to identify nonrational behavior in the sample is provided.
The Discrete/Discrete Random Utility Model
Following Hanemann (1982, 1984) , in the Budget-Constrained Random Utility Qualitative
Choice Model the consumer is assumed to maximize utility u u x q z (.) ( , , , ) = ε defined over x=(x 1 , x 2 ,…, x n ), and z, where x j represents the quantity of good j, for j=1,…,n, and z is the numeraire.
Moreover, the utility function depends also on attributes of the x's, denoted by q=(q 1 , q 2 ,…, q n ). The utility function is assumed to satisfy weak complementarity, x j = 0 → (∂ u / ∂ q j ) = 0, for j=1,…,n, that is, the attributes of a good do not matter unless that good is actually consumed. For the individual consumer ε=(ε 1 ,…, ε n ) is a set of fixed constants (or functions), but for the researcher it is a set of random variables with some joint c.d.f. F ε (ε 1 ,…, ε n ) which induces a distribution on u(.) .
Focusing on the purely qualitative utility maximizing choice case, that is, assuming that the quantities of the x j 's are fixed, the corresponding unconditional consumer's problem can be stated as follows:
Max u(x,q, z, 
The discrete choice can be represented by a set of binary valued indices δ δ 1 ,..., n , where δ j =1 if x j >0, and δ j =0 if x j =0. The choice can be expressed in terms of the conditional indirect utility functions as follows:
is a Bernoulli random variable with mean E { ∂ j } ≡ π j , given by , ) , i j} which can be expressed in terms of the joint c.d.f. of the (n-1) differences of the random terms.
By establishing the relationship between the unconditional utility maximization problem and the conditional one, the unconditional indirect utility function is obtained as follows:
where v j (.) , j=1,…,n, represents the utility derived conditional on the choice of alternative j. Therefore, v p q y ( , , , ) ε is the utility attained by the individual maximizing consumer when confronted with the choice set (p, q, y). This is a known number for the consumer but for the researcher it is a random variable with a c.d.f. obtainable from the assumed distribution for the random terms, F ε .
Testing for Rationality
In the previous section, the general structure of a random utility pure discrete choice model was described. As it is shown below, the conditional indirect utility functions v j (.) , for j=1,…,n, are the crucial building blocks for the unconditional indirect utility function. 
Basic Results
Proof: As the conditional indirect utility functions are defined in the real line, if they are monotonic in the respective price, then, they are quasi-convex (and quasi-concave). As, by Proposition 1 they are homogeneous of degree zero in price and income, then monotonicity in the respective prices is a sufficient condition for each conditional function to be an indirect utility function. On the other hand,
given Proposition 1, if each conditional indirect utility function is well-behaved, then it is nonincreasing in prices.
Flexible Functional Forms
Typically, the majority of the empirical studies have postulated a linear function for each conditional indirect utility function v j (.) , 2 and an additive error term ε j , as follows:
In this case, the simplest and most common assumptions are that either the errors are Weibull distributed, resulting in a logit model, or normal distributed, resulting in a probit model. More flexible random utility models can be generated, amongst others, by (i) allowing the random elements to enter the conditional indirect utility functions in different ways, and (ii) allowing variability in the parameters (Random Coefficients Model).
Focusing only on (ii), 3 consider the case in which there is parameter variation among individuals, that is, a Random Coefficients Model specification. One possible source of parameter heterogeneity has been viewed in the literature as due to stochastic variation. In this case, the parameter α j , for j=1,…,n, is not constant across individuals.
Letting α ij represent the parameter for individual i and site j, the corresponding individual conditional indirect utility function is as follows:
For x j = 1 , it follows from Proposition 2 that the condition to be tested in this more flexible case is:
Therefore, with a more flexible form for the conditional indirect utility function it can be the case that for some observations, that is, for some individuals, a well-behaved function exists, while for others it does not, depending on the sign of α ij . Thus, nonrational behavior can be identified in the sample.
Conclusions
One of the goals of applied demand analysis is to make welfare evaluations for policy purposes.
When making these welfare evaluations, based on the data available, the researcher relies on the neoclassical theory of preferences. In this context, the question to be addressed is how to legitimate the use of the data in order to have welfare significance. Focusing on the case of discrete choice data, the conditions under which an underlying rational preference exists are derived. These conditions are shown to be greatly simplified in this case. Moreover, by introducing flexibility into the model, a way to identify nonrational behavior in the sample is provided. This is in contrast with previous work in the literature, as, typically, rational behavior is assumed a priori.
